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Director-Liability-Reduction Laws and Conditional Conservatism 
ABSTRACT 
We study non-officer directors’ influence on the accounting conservatism of U.S. public firms. 
Between 1986 and 2002, all 50 U.S. states enacted laws that did not change officer-directors’ 
litigation risk but limited non-officer-directors’ litigation risk. We find decreases in conditional 
conservatism around the staggered law enactments, which we attribute to less non-officer director 
monitoring of financial reporting in affected firms. Conservatism fell less when shareholder or 
debtholder power were high, consistent with major stakeholders moderating the influence of non-
officer directors. Affected firms switched away from Big N auditors more often, which reduced 
these firms’ commitment to conservative financial reports. The conservatism reductions were 
concentrated in current assets and did not affect liabilities. The results are robust to many 
specification checks. Our results are consistent with non-officer directors monitoring and 
influencing the financial reporting process and have implications for corporate governance and 
corporate law reforms. 
 
Keywords: litigation risk; corporate governance; D&O insurance; non-officer directors; board 
monitoring 
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1. Introduction 
We study how non-officer directors influence the accounting conservatism of U.S. public 
firms. When directors do not act in shareholders’ interests, shareholders can sue directors for 
breach of duty. Between 1986 and 2002, all 50 U.S. states enacted laws which did not change 
officer directors’ risk but either limited or let shareholders limit non-officer directors’ litigation 
risk (Romano [2006]). Conditional conservatism is associated with less agency costs (Watts [2003]) 
and lower litigation costs (Ettredge, Huang and Zhang [2016]). We argue that these laws reduced 
directors’ incentive to monitor financial reporting, and hence, let managers reduce the conditional 
conservatism of affected firms’ earnings. We also explore how the impact of director-liability-
reduction laws varied cross-sectionally with shareholder power and debt contracting, which are 
important sources of demand for conditional conservatism. 
Non-officer directors monitor and advise managers on behalf of shareholders (Brook and 
Rao [1994]). Different from the officer directors who manage the firm, non-officer directors are 
usually outsiders who are expected to oversee the firm’s decision-making processes including 
financial reporting (Larcker and Tayan [2015]).1 Non-officer directors (including directors not 
serving on the audit committee) were named as defendants in several shareholder class-action 
lawsuits under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 and a few paid large sums out of their own 
pockets in major frauds (Black, Cheffins, and Klausner [2006]).2 Srinivasan [2005] reports that 
when firms restate financial statements, their outside directors, and especially audit committee 
members, often lose their board seats on both the restating firm and other firms. 
                                                 
1 A non-officer director is defined as a director who is not an officer (i.e., an executive) of the firm. In the U.S., non-
officer directors are almost always outside directors unless they are family members of the founder. However, in other 
countries such as Germany, employee representatives are also important non-officer directors (Fauver and Fuerst 
[2006]). Because our study examines U.S. data, our findings are most relevant to outside directors. Conversely, officer 
directors are a subset of inside directors, who also include non-officer employees and direct stakeholders. 
2 Based on settlement agreements that were publicly available in 2005, Black, Cheffins and Klausner ([2006], Table 
2) report that 12 outside directors at WorldCom paid a total of $24.75 million out of pocket, while 11 Enron outside 
directors paid out a total of $14.5 million. Most shareholder lawsuits are settled privately, and even when the settlement 
amounts are disclosed, the ultimate payers are often not specified (Black, Cheffins, and Klausner [2006], p. 1062), 
making it impossible to compile comprehensive data on outside director payments out of pocket. 
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We find that conditional conservatism decreases after the director-liability-reduction laws 
were enacted, which is consistent with non-officer directors being important monitors of their 
firms’ financial reporting. When accounting is conservative, bad news about future cash flows is 
reflected in earnings more quickly than good news (Basu [1997]). Conditional conservatism helps 
to constrain managerial opportunism and mitigate agency costs, which falls under non-officer 
directors’ monitoring responsibility (Watts [2003]; Mora and Walker [2015]; Ruch and Taylor 
[2015]). Because different states enacted director-liability-reduction laws in different years (i.e., 
in a staggered manner), firms incorporated in different states serve as controls for each other. 
We predict and find that in firms with high shareholder power or high debt-contracting 
demand, conditional conservatism decreases less after these laws are enacted. In other words, we 
find that major stakeholders, who demand conservative financial reports and who can influence 
managers’ behavior directly and/or indirectly by pressuring directors, ensure that conditional 
conservatism decreases less after non-officer directors’ litigation risk is reduced.  
We validate our results by examining the asymmetric timeliness of accruals. We first 
follow Collins, Hribar, and Tian [2014] and separately model operating accruals and cash flow 
from operations (CFO). We find that our results are concentrated in accruals rather than CFO. We 
next compare changes in current assets and changes in current operating liabilities. We find that 
the change in the asymmetric timeliness is concentrated in current assets, consistent with Ijiri and 
Nakano [1989], who emphasize that there is not a higher-or-cost-of-market rule for liabilities. 
Following Byzalov and Basu [2016], we show that accruals respond less asymmetrically after the 
law enactments to bad news indicators other than stock returns. We also find that firms are less 
likely to choose a Big N auditor after the laws are enacted, which is one way to reduce their 
commitment to conservative accounting. 
Our results are robust to several sensitivity tests. We find that director-liability-reduction 
laws are associated with less conditional conservatism after we control for state antitakeover laws. 
We confirm that our results are not likely driven by either endogenous law enactments or a 
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violation of the parallel trends assumption. In Internet Appendix A, we also verify that our results 
are not changed qualitatively when we use alternative sample selection criteria or include 
additional control variables. 
Our paper contributes in several ways. First, we provide insights into the role of the non-
officer directors by showing that decreasing their litigation risk affects financial reporting and, in 
particular, reduces conditional conservatism. Unlike prior research that studied directors’ and 
officers’ litigation risk together using Director and Officer (D&O) insurance coverage, we isolate 
the role of non-officer directors and use law changes to alleviate the concern of endogenous D&O 
insurance procurement (Hermalin and Weisbach [1998]; Ball [2008]). Second, our findings help 
in evaluating corporate governance reforms and corporate law reforms that involve the board of 
directors, and specifically non-officer directors, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. 
Third, we contribute to the debate on the net impact of director-liability-reduction laws. Prior 
research has documented both positive and negative effects for shareholders, and our paper 
identifies an additional impact of the director-liability-reduction laws. Finally, we extend recent 
research that uses staggered law changes to infer causal links between conditional conservatism 
and other variables such as law enforcement (Jayaraman [2012]), managers’ agency problem 
(Jayaraman and Shivakumar [2013]; Manchiraju, Pandey, and Subramanyam [2017]; Chen, Li, 
and Xu [2018]), and debtholders’ demand (Aier, Chen, and Pevzner [2014]). 
2. Background and Hypotheses 
2.1 NON-OFFICER DIRECTORS AND CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM 
Non-officer directors are important monitors of firms’ financial reporting processes 
(Larcker and Tayan [2015]). To strengthen non-officer directors’ incentives to monitor firms’ 
financial reporting practices, regulators and stock exchanges enacted corporate governance 
reforms after the accounting scandals in the late 1990s and early 2000s. For example, Section 301 
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of SOX requires that each member of the audit committee of a public firm be independent.3 NYSE 
and NASDAQ also required that a majority of directors be independent for all their listed firms.4 
Using extreme cases like financial statement frauds and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) enforcement actions as proxies for poor financial reporting quality, Beasley 
[1996] and Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1996] find that firms with larger proportions of outside 
directors have better financial reporting quality. Firms with more outside directors are more likely 
to issue earnings forecasts and these management forecasts are more accurate on average (Ajinkya, 
Bhojraj, and Sengupta [2005]). Last, but most relevant to our study, board independence is 
positively associated with accounting conservatism (Beekes, Pope, and Young [2004]; Ahmed and 
Duellman [2007]). 5 
Directors serving on the audit committee directly monitor financial statements. Audit 
committee independence and the presence of financial experts are associated with less earnings 
management (Klein [2002]; Xie, Davidson, and Dadalt [2003]; Bedard, Chtourou, and Courteau 
[2004]), fewer internal control problems (Krishnan [2005]; Zhang, Zhou, and Zhou [2007]), and 
fewer restatements (Agrawal and Chadha [2005]). Audit committees with more accounting 
financial experts—defined by the SEC as individuals with experience as a certified public 
accountant, auditor, chief financial officer, controller, or chief accounting officer—are associated 
with greater conditional conservatism (Krishnan and Visvanathan [2008]), and higher stock prices 
when their appointments are announced (DeFond, Hann, and Hu [2005]). 6 
                                                 
3 SOX Section 301 defines independent directors as board members who do not accept any consulting, advisory, or 
other compensatory fees from the firm and are not affiliated with the firm or its subsidiaries. Thus, independent 
directors as defined under SOX are always non-officers. 
4 NYSE and NASDAQ define independent directors in substantially more detail than SOX does. However, they also 
do not consider firm officers to be independent. 
5 Enache and Garcia-Meca (2018) find that politician directors are negatively associated with conservatism in their 
U.S. biotech sample, which suggests that independent directors vary in their influence on conservatism. 
6 SOX requires public firms to disclose whether their audit committees include financial experts or not. The SEC 
initially defined financial experts narrowly as individuals with experience as a certified public accountant, auditor, 
chief financial officer, controller, or chief accounting officer (SEC [2002]). The SEC later defined financial experts 
more broadly to include non-accounting financial experts such as individuals with experience as a chief executive 
officer or president (SEC [2003]). Krishnan and Visvanathan [2008] and DeFond, Hann, and Hu [2005] defined 
accounting financial experts following the initial narrow definition. 
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Prior research argues that directors monitor financial reporting on behalf of shareholders 
to increase conditional conservatism (e.g. Watts [2003]). LaFond and Roychowdhury [2008] argue 
that managers with a shorter horizon than shareholders prefer aggressive accounting to receive 
higher bonuses that are difficult to recover. Ball [2001] argues that conditional conservatism forces 
managers to recognize losses when projects have bad outcomes, which reduces the overinvestment 
problem. Srivastava, Sunder, and Tse [2015] find that conservative accounting makes bad news 
about projects reduce current-period income, inducing managers to abandon poor projects quickly. 
Chen, Hemmer, and Zhang [2007] find that, in a setting where shareholders intend to sell the firm 
to a buyer, a conservative accounting system lessens managers’ incentive to overstate earnings, 
reducing excessive bonus compensation and increasing shareholder welfare. Gao [2013] reaches 
a similar conclusion in a corporate financing setting. 
Because officer directors include firm managers who prepare the financial statements, non-
officer directors are introduced to act on the shareholders’ behalf and ensure the supply of 
conservative accounting reports (Ahmed and Duellman [2007]). Although prior research 
establishes that non-officer directors are associated with higher conservatism, our study of changes 
in director-liability-reduction laws lets us draw stronger causal inferences and helps us better 
understand the non-officer directors’ monitoring role in financial reporting. 
2.2 DIRECTOR DUTY, D&O INSURANCE, AND DIRECTOR LIABILITY LAWS 
Directors of U.S. corporations have two fiduciary duties: loyalty and care (Butler [2012]). 
The duty of loyalty requires fairness and/or disclosure when directors undertake self-interested 
transactions.7 The duty of care requires a director to take or refrain from board action with care, 
diligence, and exercise of reasonable skill. Because directors of public firms oversee financial 
reporting, the duty of care and its standard influence directors’ monitoring efforts, and hence, affect 
                                                 
7 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 57 (Financial Accounting Standards Board [1982]), now 
Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 850 and Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 6 (American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants [1975]), now Auditing Standard 2410 (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
[2015]), govern financial statement disclosures regarding related-party transactions including those between firms and 
directors. 
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the reported financial statements (Larcker and Tayan [2015]). Historically, U.S. corporate laws 
applied a negligence standard for duty of care (Romano [2006]), under which directors need not 
acquire all data on a firm’s activities, but they must properly inform themselves before making 
decisions for the firm (Miller [2010]). 
When directors breach their fiduciary duties, they are personally liable to shareholders. In 
such cases, shareholders can sue the directors on behalf of the firm for the harm done to it, which 
is called a derivative suit (Bourveau, Lou, and Wang [2018]). Such lawsuits hurt the sued directors’ 
reputations and finances because firms cannot reimburse the payments of a derivative suit in most 
states and indemnification is limited to legal expenses (Eisenberg and Miller [2010]). To lessen 
directors’ concern regarding their potential monetary losses, firms can purchase D&O insurance 
to cover the portion of the losses that cannot be indemnified. 
The market for D&O insurance experienced a crisis near the end of 1984 (Baker and 
Griffith [2007]). The average D&O insurance premium increased more than fivefold during 1985, 
even while the coverage decreased on average (Wyatt Company [1988]). The Smith v. Van Gorkom 
(a.k.a. TransUnion) case was likely the largest contributor to the crisis (Romano [2006]). On 
January 29, 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the TransUnion Corporation directors 
had violated their duty of care because they accepted a merger proposal after deliberating for only 
two hours and without informing themselves sufficiently about the firm value (Fischel [2002]). 
The TransUnion case shocked observers because the merger offer was at a large premium over 
TransUnion’s stock price (Elson and Gyves [2004]). However, the court disregarded the outcome 
and focused on the decision-making process, which changed the corporate community’s 
understanding of the duty of care and magnified the D&O insurance crisis (Romano [2006]). 
In response to the D&O insurance crisis, by 2003 all 50 U.S. states had modified their 
corporate laws to limit non-officer directors’ legal liability (Romano [2006]), but corporate officers’ 
legal liability was usually left unchanged. Thus, the laws appear tailored to enable firms to attract 
and retain outside directors (Baker and Griffith [2007]). The states limited director liability using 
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three approaches (Romano [2006]). The relaxation-of-culpability-standard approach lowers the 
standard of duty of care for all firms incorporated in the state from gross negligence to, for example, 
willful misconduct or recklessness. In contrast, the limited-liability charter-amendment approach 
allows but does not require shareholders to modify the articles of incorporation to limit or eliminate 
directors’ liability. Bradley and Schipani [1989] find that 94 percent of their sample of Delaware 
firms adopted the limited-liability charter provisions. Thus, the two approaches differed little in 
practice in limiting non-officer directors’ liability. Six states relaxed culpability standards, while 
more than 40 states adopted limited-liability charter amendments. In Virginia, the only state to 
adopt the damage caps approach, the individual directors’ monetary losses are capped at the greater 
of $100,000 and the directors’ annual pay just before the misconduct. 
The enactment of the director-liability-reduction laws affected firms in several ways. First, 
the rate of increase in D&O insurance premia fell after 1986 (Wyatt Company [1988]). The 
slowdown led to negative cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for firms that wrote D&O 
insurance (Bradley and Schipani [1989]). Second, the laws also reduced the covered firms’ market 
values. Delaware firms had negative CARs on the day of the law enactment (Bradley and Schipani 
[1989]; Romano [1990]) and also suffered negative CARs around the day they announced their 
adoption of the charter provisions (Bradley and Schipani [1989]).8 Khan and Wald [2015] find 
that the enactment of director-liability-reduction laws increased accrual-based earnings 
management and audit fees. Overall, existing evidence suggests that, while director-liability-
reduction laws helped to resolve the D&O insurance crisis, they also reduced firm value, likely 
reflecting the expected net costs of less outside-director monitoring.9 
                                                 
8 Inconsistent with Bradley and Schipani [1989], Romano [1990] finds that the adoption announcement CARs are 
insignificant in her sample. 
9 Brook and Rao [1994] find positive stock price reactions to the adoption of limited liability provisions for poorly 
performing firms. However, because only 16 (out of 120) firms were classified as poorly performing firms, their 
results may not generalize to most other firms. 
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2.3 DIRECTOR LITIGATION RISK AND CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM 
Litigation risk significantly affects decisions and economic outcomes (e.g., Cheng, Huang, 
Li, and Lobo [2010], Hopkins [2017]; Levy, Shalev, and Zur [2018]). Basu [1997] argues and 
finds that auditor litigation risk is an important determinant of U.S. accounting conservatism, 
which is consistent with litigation costs being higher when earnings are overstated (Kellogg [1984]; 
St. Pierre and Anderson [1984]). 10  Prior studies use time periods, legal systems of different 
countries, cross-listing status of firms, and strength of legal enforcement to explore how litigation 
risk affects conditional conservatism (e.g., Ball, Kothari, and Robin [2000]; Holthausen and Watts 
[2001]; Lang, Raedy, and Yetman [2003]; Huijgen and Lubberink [2005]; Bushman and Piotroski 
[2006]; Jayaraman [2012]). The litigation risks of stakeholders such as auditors and directors are 
decreasing in conditional conservatism (e.g., Qiang [2007]; Chung and Wynn [2008]), as is the 
litigation risk to the firm itself (Ettredge, Huang, and Zhang [2016]). 
We argue that a reduction in directors’ litigation risk can reduce non-officer-directors’ 
monitoring incentives, and hence, influence conditional conservatism. We build on Watts and 
Zimmerman [1990], who argue that contracting parties, which include non-officer directors and 
managers, select firms’ “accepted sets” of accounting policies ex-ante to contain managerial 
opportunism ex-post, and that such accounting policies can be conservative. Because non-officer 
directors oversee both ex-ante policy sets and ex-post estimates and judgements, below we discuss 
how decreases in directors’ monitoring of ex-ante and ex-post choices can change conservatism. 
When the accounting policies are being selected ex-ante, a lower litigation risk will likely 
reduce non-officer directors’ incentives to monitor and seek more conservative accounting policies. 
This is because, after the law change, non-officer directors are less likely to lose lawsuits, pay out 
money from their own pockets, or damage their reputation and labor market value (Srinivasan 
                                                 
10 Basu, Hwang and Jan [2002] report that conservatism peaked in 1985, which matches the spike of the D&O 
insurance crisis, although they attribute the jump to the Rosenblum decision [Rosenblum v. Adler, 444 A. 2d 66 (N.J. 
1982), 461 A. 2d 138 (N.J. 1983)] which let foreseeable parties sue auditors; and the Schact decision [Schact v. Brown, 
711 F.2d (CA-7, 1983)] which applied the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to auditors, 
and tripled damages. 
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[2005]; Fich and Shivdasani [2007]) while monitoring is still personally costly (Adams and 
Ferreira [2007]; Laux [2008]; Taylor [2010]). That is, while directors’ personal costs of monitoring 
do not change after the law enactments, some benefits of monitoring (i.e., less litigation risk) fall. 
Hence, non-officer directors, especially those who sit on audit committees, are less likely to 
propose a stricter verifiability standard for good news than bad news and/or to choose a high-
quality auditor to ensure conservative reporting. Therefore, in equilibrium, conditional 
conservatism will decrease after the director-liability-reduction laws are enacted. Internet 
Appendix B demonstrates this intuition more formally. 
In contrast to containing managerial opportunism through monitoring the accounting 
policy selection ex-ante, non-officer directors can also reduce managerial opportunism by 
monitoring managers ex-post. For example, monitoring by independent directors may deter 
managers’ empire building (Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis [2012]). Because both conservative 
accounting policies selected ex-ante and non-officer directors’ monitoring ex-post of accounting 
estimates and other operating decisions can decrease managerial opportunism, they can be 
substitutes. Thus, if other contracting parties such as debtholders expect directors to reduce their 
monitoring efforts ex-post, they will demand more conditional conservatism ex-ante (Jayaraman 
and Shivakumar [2013]). If firms do not meet this demand, debtholders will raise interest rates to 
price-protect themselves. More conservative accounting policies may be selected ex-ante to avoid 
higher interest rates, and the equilibrium conservatism level may increase rather than decrease. 
Finally, the lower litigation risk may increase the supply of non-officer directors (Baker 
and Griffith [2007]), especially bad or weak directors who do not monitor managers effectively 
and likely would have withheld their services when litigation risk was high. Thus, board 
monitoring could also weaken if ineffective non-officer directors are recruited after these law 
enactments. However, we acknowledge that the weak directors may not be selected because the 
talented and/or more risk-averse directors, both of whom could be better monitors, would still 
participate in the director labor market when litigation risk is lower. 
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Summing up, theory suggests that conditional conservatism will decrease with non-officer 
directors’ monitoring ex-ante and will increase with their monitoring ex-post. We state our first 
hypothesis in the following alternative form: 
H1: Conditional conservatism decreases after director-liability-reduction laws are enacted. 
2.4 INTERACTION OF DIRECTOR LIABILITY LAWS AND OTHER DETERMINANTS OF 
CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM 
 Bushman and Piotroski [2006] find that the presence of large shareholders is positively 
associated with conditional conservatism because they monitor the financial reporting process. 
Institutions are often powerful shareholders of U.S. public firms, and Ramalingegowda and Yu 
[2012] find that high-monitoring institutional ownership increases conservatism.11 Institutional 
investors can influence conservatism by putting pressure on directors who do not monitor 
diligently, or by directly pressuring managers. However, when shareholder power is weak (or 
managerial power is strong), shareholders’ demand for conservatism will not be satisfied when 
directors stop monitoring closely. Therefore, we predict that the director-liability-reduction laws 
reduce (increase) conditional conservatism less (more) for firms with high shareholder power 
(Jayaraman and Shivakumar [2013]). Thus, our second hypothesis stated in alternative form is: 
H2: Enactment of director-liability-reduction laws is associated with less of a decrease (or more 
of an increase) in conditional conservatism in firms with higher shareholder power. 
Prior studies show theoretically and empirically that debt-contracting demand is a major 
driver of conditional conservatism (Ball and Shivakumar [2005]; Zhang [2008]; Gigler, Kanodia, 
Sapra, and Venugopalan [2009]; Göx and Wagenhofer [2009]; Nikolaev [2010]; Li [2013]).12 
Jayaraman and Shivakumar [2013] find that, after states passed antitakeover laws that effectively 
                                                 
11 Cheng, Huang, and Li [2015] find similarly that hedge fund interventions increase accounting conservatism.  
12 Erkens, Subramanyam, and Zhang [2014] find that firms whose lenders have board seats report less conservatively 
than similar firms without affiliated bankers on their boards. They argue that when lenders have direct monitoring 
ability and inside access to data, they rely less on general-purpose financial statements for monitoring, reducing their 
demand for accounting conservatism. Because their data on banker affiliations is from 2000-2006, after most of our 
sample law enactments, we do not test this moderating influence. 
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protected managers’ jobs, firms with high debt-contracting pressure reported more conservatively 
to resolve debtholders’ concern about their higher agency conflict with managers. Thus, we expect 
that any negative (positive) effect of the new laws on director monitoring would be alleviated 
(strengthened) by higher debt-contracting demand. 
Thus, our third hypothesis stated in alternative form is: 
H3: Enactment of director-liability-reduction laws is associated with less decrease (or more 
increase) in conditional conservatism in firms with high debt-contracting demand. 
3. Research Design 
3.1 CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM MEASURE 
Following Basu [1997], we measure conditional conservatism as the asymmetric timeliness 
of earnings in reflecting news about expected future cash flows. We include firm fixed effects to 
control for unobservable firm characteristics that are correlated with expected earnings (Ball, 
Kothari, and Nikolaev [2013]). Consistent with Jayaraman and Shivakumar [2013], we modify the 
Basu [1997] model by adding firm and year fixed effects as follows: 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (1) 
where EARN is the income before extraordinary items scaled by beginning-of-year market value 
of equity, RET is the market-adjusted stock return during the fiscal year, NEG is a dummy variable 
that indicates bad future cash flow news and equals 1 if RET < 0 and equals 0 otherwise, and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
and 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 represent firm and year fixed effects. Model (1) does not need a separate intercept when 
fixed effects are added (Christensen, Hail, and Leuz [2013]). All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. In model (1), conditional conservatism is measured by the slope coefficient 𝛽𝛽3, which 
captures the difference in earnings timeliness between bad and good news. With conservative 
accounting, earnings reflect bad news faster than good news, and hence, 𝛽𝛽3 in regression model 
(1) should be positive (Basu [1997]). 
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3.2 CHANGE IN CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM AFTER DIRECTOR-LIABILITY-
REDUCTION LAW ENACTMENTS 
Our goal is to study whether the asymmetric timeliness coefficient 𝛽𝛽3 changes after the 
director-liability-reduction laws are enacted. Following Jayaraman and Shivakumar [2013], we 
interact every term except the fixed effects terms in model (1) with POST, an indicator for 
observations after the law enactment, and estimate the following regression model: 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × �𝛽𝛽4 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (2) 
Because the different states enacted director liability laws in a staggered fashion, POST has 
different values for firms incorporated in different states in a given year. Thus, firms incorporated 
in different states can be viewed as control firms for each other, which enables us to separate the 
director-liability-reduction laws from time trends in conservatism identified previously (e.g., Basu 
[1997]; Givoly and Hayn [2000]; Holthausen and Watts [2001]; Basu, Hwang, and Jan [2002]; 
Ryan and Zarowin [2003]; Lobo and Zhou [2006]; Shroff, Venkataraman, and Zhang [2013]). 
POST is interacted with every term of the Basu model so that changes in conditional conservatism 
(as captured by 𝛽𝛽7) and changes in the earnings reaction to cash flow news and the bad news 
indicator (as captured by 𝛽𝛽5 and 𝛽𝛽6, respectively) can be separated. To fully disentangle the change 
in conditional conservatism after the law enactments from the level of conditional conservatism 
determined by time-invariant state-level variables and the market-wide time trend, we further build 
a fixed-effects structure into the slope coefficients 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 (j = 1, 2, 3) as below: 
 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 = �𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘
𝐾𝐾
+ �𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗,𝑚𝑚𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀
 (3) 
where State and Year are state and year indicator variables, respectively.13 Adding this fixed-
effects structure can eliminate alternative explanations such as that states differ in their 
conservatism levels before the law enactments because similar firms often co-locate (Ellison and 
                                                 
13 For completeness, we apply the fixed effects structure as in model (3) to all the coefficients of the Basu model. In 
untabulated tests, we find that our main results are not changed if we use the fixed effects structure for 𝛽𝛽3 only. 
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Glaeser [1997]). As before, we do not include an intercept in equation (3) because it is subsumed 
by the fixed-effects structure (Christensen, Hail, and Leuz [2013]). 
Under H1, conditional conservatism will decrease after the director-liability-reduction laws 
were enacted. Therefore, 𝛽𝛽7 is predicted to be negative. Because POST captures a change in non-
officer directors’ litigation risk that affects non-officer directors’ monitoring effort but is not a 
result of, for example, optimal contracting (Hermalin and Weisbach [1998]), our research context 
and design have less of an endogeneity problem and can help us draw stronger causal inferences. 
3.3 SHAREHOLDER POWER AND THE CHANGE IN CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM 
Next, we study how the change in conditional conservatism differs for firms with different 
levels of shareholder power. We test whether the coefficient 𝛽𝛽7 in model (2) varies systematically 
between firms with different shareholder power. We consider two shareholder power measures, 
institutional ownership and G-index. Ramalingegowda and Yu [2012] argue and find that 
institutional investors are powerful shareholders who induce high conservatism. G-index, in 
contrast, measures strong managerial power and/or weak shareholder power (Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick [2003]; Cremers and Ferrell [2014]). We interact a shareholder power proxy SHPOWER 
with every term except the fixed effects in model (2) and estimate the following regression model: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × �𝛽𝛽4 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × �𝛽𝛽8 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡× �𝛽𝛽12 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽15𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
(4) 
where SHPOWER represents either institutional ownership or G-index. We use two measures for 
institutional ownership, the percentage of outstanding common shares owned by institutional 
investors and the percentage of outstanding common shares owned by “dedicated” institutional 
shareholders following Bushee [2001]. We include the second measure of institutional ownership 
because Bushee [2001] finds that some institutional investors such as quasi-index funds monitor 
firm decisions less closely, and thus, they likely influence financial reporting less. Because the 
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original G-index developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [2003] is available starting only from 
1990, we use the G-index data collected by Cremers and Ferrell [2014] for the earlier period. 
Similar to Cremers and Ferrell [2014], we require no more than 5 missing items (out of the 24 
items that comprise the G-index) for the G-index calculation to eliminate the most imprecise G-
index data in the sample.14 The fixed-effects structure for the slope coefficients in equation (3) is 
also applied. Following H2, the decrease in conditional conservatism is expected to be less for 
firms with high shareholder power, so 𝛽𝛽15 is predicted to be positive for institutional ownership 
and negative for G-index.  
3.4 DEBT-CONTRACTING DEMAND AND THE CHANGE IN CONDITIONAL 
CONSERVATISM 
Finally, we study how the change in conditional conservatism varies across firms with 
different levels of debt-contracting demand. We test whether the coefficient 𝛽𝛽7 varies between 
firms with different debt-contracting demand. As before, we interact a debt-contracting-demand 
proxy DCD with every term in regression model (2) and estimate the following model: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × �𝛽𝛽4 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 × �𝛽𝛽8𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × �𝛽𝛽11 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (5) 
where, following Jayaraman and Shivakumar [2013], debt-contracting-demand proxy DCD is first 
defined as a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is a net debt issuer (i.e., a firm increased total 
debt, defined as short-term debt plus long-term debt scaled by total assets, around law enactment). 
For robustness, we use the change in total debt after law enactment itself as another proxy for DCD. 
One advantage of using this continuous measure is that it distinguishes the debt-contracting 
demand for firms within the net debt issuer and non-issuer groups. DCD is not included as a 
separate term in the regression because the firm fixed-effects subsume it. The fixed-effects 
                                                 
14 Institutional ownership and G-index could be affected by the director-liability-reduction laws. In an untabulated 
robustness test, we measure them in the year just before the enactment of the laws and find consistent results. 
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structure on the slope coefficients in equation (3) is also applied. Following H3, the decrease in 
conditional conservatism is expected to be less for firms with high debt-contracting demand. 
Therefore, 𝛽𝛽14 is predicted to be positive. 
4. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
We start our sample with all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firm-year observations 
between 1976 and 2002 in the Compustat/CRSP database. We end the sample in 2002 to eliminate 
any confounding effects of SOX. We first exclude firm-years with missing values for the key 
variables used in our regressions, with non-positive total assets, or with beginning-of-year stock 
price below $1.00. We also exclude financial institutions because their accounting is different and 
they are regulated. We drop cross-listed foreign firms and firm-years with missing incorporation 
state data. Firms that are incorporated in Washington, D.C., and U.S. territories such as Puerto 
Rico are also dropped. 15  Following Jayaraman and Shivakumar [2013] and Aier, Chen and 
Pevzner [2014], we exclude law-enactment-year observations and require our sample firms to have 
observations from at least one year before and one year after the law enactments. Our main sample 
consists of 32,418 firm-year observations. Our sample size is smaller when additional data such 
as institutional ownership are used. Our results are robust to many alternative sample selection 
criteria, which we discuss in Internet Appendix A. 
Table 1 lists the year each state first enacted a director-liability-reduction law and the 
number of firm-year observations before and after the law was enacted for each state. For most 
states, there are more observations after law enactment than before. Most states enacted their first 
director-liability-reduction laws in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, with only Missouri (2000) and 
West Virginia (2002) waiting until the 2000’s. Approximately 43 percent (=14,059/32,418) of the 
                                                 
15 Compustat provides the current incorporation state data, but companies change their states of incorporation over 
time. To obtain historical data, we combine the incorporation state data from (1) 10-K heading (downloaded on 
02/21/2017 from Bill McDonald’s website http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/10-K_Headers/10-K_Headers.html), (2) 
Compact Disclosure company address data, and (3) IRRC database. Because these sources only contain incorporation 
state data as early as 1989, we further search company profiles on Mergent Online to identify any incorporation-state 
changes before 1989. 
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firm-year observations are from Delaware, which often pioneers corporate law reforms that are 
particularly attractive to public firms. 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the samples before and after law enactments in 
Panel A and Panel B, respectively. Panel C in Table 2 reports the mean and median differences of 
the variables before and after law enactments and tests whether the differences are statistically 
different from zero. The average income before extraordinary items scaled by market value of 
equity (EARN) is smaller after law enactment (0.048) than before (0.102), which is a statistically 
significant difference (p-value < 0.001). However, our univariate analysis cannot identify whether 
this decrease is due to a general time trend of more frequent losses (e.g., Hayn [1995]; Fama and 
French [2001], [2004]) or due to the director-liability-reduction laws. There is also a statistically 
significant decrease (p-value < 0.001) in buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock return (RET). Both 
before and after law enactments, about half of the observations are classified as having bad news 
about future cash flows (NEG = 1). The average firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of 
market value of equity, grows, while the average book-to-market ratio falls after law enactments. 
These differences are statistically significant. Since book-to-market ratio is often used as a proxy 
for conservatism, the fall in average book-to-market ratio is consistent with accounting becoming 
more conservative after the director-liability-reduction laws were enacted, which is the opposite 
of our prediction and may be because our univariate analysis does not separately model the law 
enactments and market-wide time trends.16 
5. Empirical Results 
Table 3 reports results for the change in conditional conservatism after director-liability-
reduction law enactments based on regression model (2). The standard errors are clustered at the 
state level for all regressions (Bertrand and Mullainathan [2003]; Bertrand, Duflo, and 
                                                 
16 Book-to-market ratio reflects both unconditional and conditional conservatism in the past (e.g., Basu [2001], [2005]; 
Beaver and Ryan [2005]; Roychowdhury and Watts [2007]) although it also reflects other factors such as historical 
cost accounting, inflation, economic rents and technological change (e.g., Basu [1997]; Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang 
[2018]) and reductions in exchange listing standards over time (Fama and French [2001], [2004]; Srivastava [2014]). 
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Mullainathan [2004]; Jayaraman and Shivakumar [2013]). Our fixed-effects structure absorbs the 
intercept and the slope coefficients from the Basu [1997] model, so we do not report them in the 
table. In Column I, we find that the slope coefficient on the three-way interaction of POST, NEG, 
and RET is negative and statistically significant (𝛽𝛽7 = -0.221, p-value = 0.015). Consistent with 
H1, conditional conservatism decreases on average after the director-liability-reduction laws were 
enacted. In untabulated tests, we find that 𝛽𝛽7 is negative and significant but smaller when the fixed-
effects structure is dropped (𝛽𝛽7 = -0.073, p-value < 0.001).17 Prior research reports a market-wide 
increase in conservatism during our sample period (e.g., Ryan and Zarowin [2003]), so our main 
estimate is likely biased upward when this trend is not controlled for. The coefficient on POST is 
statistically insignificant. Thus, the broad decline in earnings observed in Table 2 does not seem 
to be related to the enactment of the director-liability-reduction laws. 
Under the internal affairs doctrine, the law of the state of incorporation governs corporate 
law disputes. However, firms can also be sued in their principal place of business (i.e., headquarters 
state). While the director-liability-reduction law of the incorporation state is always applied, the 
courts in the headquarters state (if different from incorporation state) might apply the laws slightly 
differently (Armour, Black, and Cheffins [2012]). For robustness, we estimate model (2) using a 
subsample of firms that are headquartered and incorporated in the same state in Column II of Table 
3. We find consistent results. When comparing 𝛽𝛽7 from this subsample (-0.223) with that from the 
subsample of firms that are headquartered and incorporated in different states (-0.220, untabulated), 
we find that they do not differ statistically or economically. 
Table 4 presents the estimates of the moderating effect of shareholder power on the change 
in conditional conservatism after the director-liability-reduction-law enactments based on 
regression model (4). The sample sizes shrink because the tests require institutional ownership  or 
G-index data (21,531 and 11,774 firm-years. respectively). Our two proxies for institutional 
                                                 
17 The coefficient on the interaction of NEG and RET is 0.128 (p-value < 0.001). Thus, adding it to the coefficient on 
the three-way interaction we have 0.055 (p-value < 0.001), suggesting that firms still report conservatively after the 
law enactments. 
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ownership are the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors and the percentage of 
shares owned by dedicated institutional investors following Bushee [2001]. We estimate model (4) 
using both proxies and find that the coefficient on the four-way interaction of SHPOWER, POST, 
NEG, and RET is positive and significant at the 1 percent level (Specification I: 𝛽𝛽15 = 0.164, p-
value = 0.007; Specification II: 𝛽𝛽15 = 0.489, p-value = 0.007). In Specification III, we examine the 
moderating effect of the G-index and find that the coefficient on the four-way interaction is 
negative and significant at the 5 percent level (𝛽𝛽15 = -0.023, p-value = 0.050). Consistent with H2, 
firms with higher shareholder power have less of a decrease in conditional conservatism after law 
enactments. Using the estimates from Specification II, we calculate that the director-liability-laws 
would not reduce conditional conservatism when dedicated institutional investors hold more than 
49.9 percent (=0.244/0.489) of the firm’s shares. Because the highest dedicated institutional 
ownership in our sample is 38.3 percent, it is very unlikely that the laws increased conditional 
conservatism even for high institutional ownership firms. The coefficient on the interaction of 
POST, NEG, and RET is negative and significant for Specifications I and II (Specification I: 𝛽𝛽7 = 
-0.296, p-value < 0.001; Specification II: 𝛽𝛽7 = -0.244, p-value = 0.040), which is consistent with 
H1 and the findings in Table 3. This coefficient is negative but statistically insignificant for 
Specification III, indicating that conditional conservatism does not decrease for the firms with the 
least managerial power (i.e., G-index equals 0). 
Table 5 shows the estimates of the moderating effect of debt-contracting demand on the 
change in conditional conservatism after the enactments of director-liability-reduction laws based 
on regression model (5). We use two proxies for debt-contracting demand: a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the firm is a net debt issuer (i.e., total debt increases after law enactment) following 
Jayaraman and Shivakumar [2013] and the change in total debt itself. We find that the coefficient 
on the four-way interaction of DCD, POST, NEG, and RET is positive and significant at the 1 
percent level for both proxies (Specification I: 𝛽𝛽14 = 0.121, p-value < 0.001; Specification II: 𝛽𝛽14 
= 0.449, p-value < 0.001). This finding suggests that firms with higher debt-contracting demand 
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had less reduction in conditional conservatism after director-liability-law enactments consistent 
with H3. Consistent with H1 and findings in the previous tables, the coefficient on the interaction 
of POST, NEG, and RET is negative and statistically significant in both specifications 
(Specification I: 𝛽𝛽7 = -0.256, p-value = 0.004; Specification II: 𝛽𝛽7 = -0.211, p-value = 0.016). The 
coefficient on the interaction of DCD, NEG, and RET is negative and significant, which suggests 
that net debt issuers were less conservative before laws were enacted. Given that net debt issuers 
had lower leverage on average before law enactment (p-value < 0.001), this finding is consistent 
less levered firms reporting less conservatively (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar [2005]). 
Summing up, we find strong evidence that conditional conservatism decreases after states 
enacted laws reducing non-officer-directors’ incentives to monitor the financial reporting process. 
The smaller decrease in conditional conservatism for firms with high shareholder power and high 
debt-contracting demand reported in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively, suggests that the demand 
for conservatism from major stakeholders moderates the non-officer directors’ influence on 
conditional conservatism. 
6. Validation Tests: Asymmetric Timeliness of Accruals and Auditor Choice 
6.1 ASYMMETRIC TIMELINESS OF OPERATING ACCRUALS AND CASH FLOWS 
The asymmetric timeliness of earnings reported above could arise from operating accruals 
and/or cash flow from operations (CFO). Hsu, O’Hanlon, and Peasnell [2012] and Collins, Hribar, 
and Tian [2014] argue that only the asymmetric timeliness of operating accruals can be interpreted 
as conditional conservatism while the asymmetric timeliness of CFO cannot. Therefore, we 
conduct several accruals tests to validate that our main results stem from changes in conservatism. 
First, we adopt Collins, Hribar, and Tian’s [2014] approach and replace the dependent 
variable of regression (2) with accruals or CFO as follows: 
 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × (𝛽𝛽4 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (6) 
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where 𝑌𝑌 is either operating accruals ACCR (calculated using a balance sheet approach following 
Collins, Hribar and Tian [2014] as the change in current non-cash assets minus the change in 
current non-debt liability minus depreciation) or operating cash flow CFO (defined as the 
difference between earnings EARN and accruals ACCR), with both scaled by beginning-of-year 
market value of equity. The sample size for this table is smaller because we require sufficient data 
to calculate accruals.18 The fixed-effects structure in equation (3) is also added. The coefficient of 
interest for regression model (6) is 𝛽𝛽7 . If our main results reflect a decrease in conditional 
conservatism after law enactments, we expect 𝛽𝛽7 to be negative in the accruals regression. 
Columns I and II in Panel A of Table 6 report the estimates of model (6) for accruals and 
CFO, respectively. We find that the coefficient on the three-way interaction of POST, NEG, and 
RET is negative and significant at the 1 percent level for accruals (𝛽𝛽7 = -0.235, p-value = 0.008) 
but is positive and statistically insignificant for CFO (𝛽𝛽7 = 0.011, p-value = 0.313). Thus, Table 6 
suggests that our main findings are fully driven by changes in accruals asymmetry, consistent with 
H1. In untabulated tests, we find that the cross-sectional results in Tables 4 and 5 hold if we replace 
earnings with operating accruals as the dependent variable.  
6.2 ASYMMETRIC TIMELINESS OF ACCRUAL COMPONENTS 
Conditional conservatism is implemented by asset impairments and write-offs (Basu 
[1997]; Watts [2003]; Qiang [2007]). Thus, examining how the asymmetric timeliness of different 
accrual components changes differently after the law enactments can further verify if our main 
results likely capture conservatism.19 For example, conditional conservatism applied via a lower-
of-cost-or-market adjustment for inventory should lead to asymmetric timeliness of the change in 
                                                 
18 We set depreciation (Compustat data item DP) and deferred tax and investment tax credit (Compustat data item 
TXDITC) to zero if missing. We use a balance sheet approach because statement of cash flow data under SFAS 95 
(FASB 1987) become available only after many states had already adopted director-liability-reduction laws (Table 1). 
19  Conditional conservatism can be measured directly from goodwill impairments and other asset write-downs 
(Lawrence, Sloan, and Sun [2013]; Banker, Basu, and Byzalov [2017]). Unfortunately, detailed data on goodwill 
impairments and other asset write-downs are only available from Compustat since 1996, when all states except 
Missouri and West Virginia had already enacted their director-liability-reduction laws (Table 1). Small subsamples 
from these two states would cause a low-power test of the impact of director-liability-reduction laws on conditional 
conservatism. 
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inventory component of accruals, but there is no symmetric higher-of-cost-or-market rule for 
current liabilities (Ijiri and Nakano [1989]; Byzalov and Basu [2016]). 
We analyze working capital accruals because Banker, Basu, Byzalov, and Chen [2016] 
report that the depreciation asymmetry is caused by cost stickiness rather than conservatism. We 
decompose working capital accruals into change in noncash current assets ΔCA (defined as change 
in current assets minus cash) and negative change in current operating liabilities -ΔCL (defined as 
negative change in current liabilities minus short-term debt minus deferred tax and investment tax 
credits). Based on the discussion above, we predict that current assets but not current liabilities 
will exhibit less asymmetric timeliness in model (6) after law enactments, so 𝛽𝛽7 will be negative 
for current assets but not for current liabilities. 
Columns III and IV in Panel A of Table 6 report our estimation results. We find that the 
asymmetric timeliness of the current assets component ΔCA is -0.251, similar in size to the 
asymmetric timeliness of total accruals (-0.235), and significant at the 5 percent level. We do not 
find a significant change for the current liability component -ΔCL. These contrasting results are 
consistent with the predicted impact of conditional conservatism on working capital accrual 
components (Byzalov and Basu [2016]; Ijiri and Nakano [1989]). In untabulated tests, we find that 
the cross-sectional results in Tables 4 and 5 continue to hold if we replace earnings with the change 
in current assets, ΔCA. 
Following Byzalov and Basu [2016], we decompose change in noncash current assets ΔCA 
into change in inventories (ΔINV) and change in receivables (ΔREC) and examine them separately. 
Columns V and VI report negative and statistically significant 𝛽𝛽7 coefficients for both ΔINV and 
ΔREC. Cost stickiness should not affect receivables (which relate to revenues rather than costs) 
and predicts an opposite asymmetry for inventory (Byzalov and Basu [2016]), eliminating a 
possible alternative explanation for our main results. 
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6.3 ACCRUAL ASYMMETRY AND DISAGGREGATED BAD NEWS INDICATORS 
Byzalov and Basu [2016] argue and show that accruals exhibit an asymmetry with respect 
to various disaggregated non-return bad news indicators such as negative sales growth, negative 
employee growth, and negative CFO.20 Their model extends the Dechow and Dichev [2002], Ball 
and Shivakumar ([2005]; [2006]), and Allen, Larson, and Sloan [2013] models as follows: 
 𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1+ 𝛽𝛽6𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡× 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡× 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽15𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (7) 
where ACC is accruals scaled by beginning-of-year total assets, SGR is sales growth, EGR is 
employee growth, CF is operating cash flow scaled by beginning-of-year total assets, DS, DE, and 
DC are indicators for negative SGR, EGR, and CF, respectively. Byzalov and Basu [2016] predict 
and find that conservatism leads to positive 𝛽𝛽11, 𝛽𝛽12, 𝛽𝛽14, and 𝛽𝛽15 and negative 𝛽𝛽13. 
We apply the Byzalov and Basu [2016] model by interacting every term except the fixed 
effects with POST. We also use a similar fixed-effects structure to equation (3) for this model (i.e., 
the state- and year- fixed-effects structure is added for 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗, j = 1, 2, …, 15). We predict that, because 
conditional conservatism decreases after the law enactments, the coefficients of the additional 
interaction terms will be opposite in sign to those in the Byzalov and Basu [2016] model. We 
require all our observations to have sales revenue and number of employee data. Following Banker, 
Basu, Byzalov, and Chen [2016], we also eliminate observations with more than 50 percent change 
in either sales or number of employees to remove firm-years that potentially had non-articulating 
transactions such as mergers & acquisitions and significant divestitures that systematically impact 
accruals through channels other than conservatism (Hribar and Collins [2002]). 
                                                 
20 Patatoukas and Thomas [2011], [2016] argue that the conservatism measure from the Basu [1997] model is biased 
because of the return distribution. Because the Byzalov and Basu [2016] model examines non-return indicators, it 
does not suffer from this bias. In addition, Collins, Hribar and Tian [2014] report that the Patatoukas and Thomas 
[2011] bias is concentrated in CFO and does not affect the operating accruals that we analyze in this section. 
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Panel B of Table 6 reports the estimation results. We find that the coefficient signs are all 
consistent with our predictions. Three out of five coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 
percent level or better. The coefficients are not all statistically significant perhaps because the bad 
news indicators often occur simultaneously, which can cause high multicollinearity. For example, 
the correlation between POST×SGR×DS and POST×EGR×DE is 0.52. Overall, our findings in 
Table 6 are consistent with accruals asymmetric timeliness falling after director-liability-reduction 
laws were enacted, validating our inference about decreased conservatism. 
6.4 DIRECTOR-LIABILITY-REDUCTION LAWS AND AUDITOR CHOICE 
Prior literature hypothesizes that Big N auditors are more likely to supply conditional 
conservatism for litigation and reputation reasons, and shows that they are positively associated 
with conditional conservatism (e.g., Basu, Hwang, and Jan [2001], Ruddock, Taylor and Taylor, 
[2006]). In other words, when selecting the “accepted set” of accounting policies ex-ante, Big N 
auditors can serve as a “commitment device” to ensure conservatism is supplied. Thus, we 
investigate whether firms are less likely to choose Big N auditors after the enactment of the 
director-liability-reduction laws, as one way to reduce their commitment to conservatism. 
Specifically, we estimate the following regression: 
 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + �𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸 + 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (8) 
where the dependent variable BIGN is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i chooses a Big N 
auditor (Compustat data item AU is between 1 and 8) in year t and equals 0 otherwise. We follow 
DeFond, Erkens, and Zhang [2016] and include log of total assets, asset turnover ratio, current 
ratio, leverage, and return-on-assets as control variables. Consistent with our main tests, state and 
year fixed effects are included, and standard errors are clustered by states. Because BIGN is a 
dummy variable, we estimate a logit regression. Our results are consistent if we estimate a linear 
regression instead. We expect that, if firms become less likely to choose Big N auditors, the 
coefficient on POST (i.e., 𝛽𝛽) should be negative. 
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Table 7 presents the estimation results of model (8). We find the coefficient on POST is 
negative and significant at the 5 percent level, consistent with our expectation. The marginal effect 
of the coefficient is -0.030, suggesting that firms are 3 percent less likely to choose a Big N auditor 
after the director-liability-reduction-law enactments.21 
7. Robustness Checks 
7.1 INTERACTION BETWEEN TIMING OF ANTITAKEOVER LAWS AND DIRECTOR-
LIABILITY-REDUCTION-LAW ENACTMENTS 
Jayaraman and Shivakumar [2013] predict and find that business combination laws, a type 
of antitakeover law, lead to an increased supply of conditional conservatism to counter an 
amplified agency problem between managers and shareholders/debtholders. Because many 
business combination laws were enacted during our sample period, we re-estimate our regression 
by controlling for these laws as follows:22  
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × �𝛽𝛽4 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × �𝛽𝛽8 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (9) 
where BC is an indicator that equals one if the observation is after the business combination law 
enactment and equals zero otherwise. The fixed-effects structure as in equation (3) is also included 
in the estimation. We predict that 𝛽𝛽7  is negative and 𝛽𝛽11  is positive. To make our results 
comparable to those of Jayaraman and Shivakumar [2013], we follow their sample selection 
criteria and use a subsample that (1) stops at 1995, (2) drops the business combination law-
enactment-year observations, and (3) ensures that each firm has data from at least one year before 
and one year after the business combination law enactments. 
                                                 
21 We find that 15.6 percent of the sample firms chose non-Big N auditors before law enactments, so the 3 percent 
represents a nearly 20 percent increase in use of non-Big N auditors. 
22 Bertrand and Mullainathan [2003] identify 30 states that enacted business combination laws before 1995, and 
Barzuza [2009] extends the list to 2007. Combining their law enactment data with ours, we find that, among all 50 
states, 36 states enacted the director-liability-reduction laws first, 9 states enacted both laws in the same year, and 5 
states enacted the business combination laws first. Because business combination laws increase conditional 
conservatism, their confounding effect works against us finding a negative impact of director-liability-reduction laws 
on conditional conservatism. 
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 Table 8 reports the results of the regression model (9). In Columns I and II, we estimate 
two specifications, one with only the year-fixed-effects structure for the Basu coefficients to be 
consistent with Jayaraman and Shivakumar [2013] and the other with the complete fixed-effects 
structure as in equation (3). We find that, for both specifications, the impact of director-liability-
reduction laws is negative and significant, consistent with our main results. Furthermore, because 
Karpoff and Wittry [2018] find that the business combination laws may not be the only effective 
antitakeover laws, we extend model (9) by controlling for the impact of the other four types of 
antitakeover laws (i.e., control share acquisition law, fair price law, directors’ duties law, and 
poison pill law) in Column III. Also, to ensure the results are not driven by the first-generation 
antitakeover laws, we exclude observations before 1983. We find consistent results again. 23 
Consistent with Jayaraman and Shivakumar [2013], we find that conditional conservatism 
increases after the enactments of business combination laws. However, the changes in conditional 
conservatism are not statistically significant after the enactments of other types of antitakeover 
laws (untabulated). 
 Related to the above analysis but more generally, we also consider the possible endogenous 
timing of law enactments. The endogeneity may arise from two sources, reverse causality and 
correlated omitted variables. We argue that reverse causality is unlikely because the states enacted 
the laws to lower non-officer-directors’ litigation risk and D&O insurance premium, not to respond 
to or facilitate aggressive accounting. For the potential correlated omitted variables problem, if 
such omitted variables are time-invariant for each state or have a homogeneous impact on the 
entire market for each period, our fixed-effects structure (equation (3)) controls sufficiently. 
However, there may be other state-level time-varying variables such as state gross domestic 
product (GDP) that simultaneously affect law enactment and conditional conservatism. To address 
this alternative explanation, we follow Jenkins [1995] and estimate a logit hazard model to 
                                                 
23 In a robustness check, we further exclude the lobbying firms for the antitakeover laws as identified by Karpoff and 
Wittry [2018, Table 3] and find consistent results. 
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examine whether the timing of the law enactments can be predicted by state-level time-varying 
variables. The dependent variable is an indicator of whether the director-liability-reduction law 
was enacted for a particular state-year combination. Once a state enacts the law, all future 
observations of that state are dropped from the sample. The hazard rate h (i.e., the probability that 
the director-liability-reduction law is enacted in that year, conditional on the law has not been 
enacted yet) for state 𝑗𝑗 and year 𝑆𝑆 is as follows: 
 
ℎ𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆(𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 + ��𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘𝑋𝑋�𝑘𝑘,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘�𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑋𝑋�𝑘𝑘,𝑗𝑗��𝐾𝐾
𝑘𝑘=1
 (10) 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is the 𝑘𝑘th state-level variable for state 𝑗𝑗 in year 𝑆𝑆, 𝑋𝑋�𝑘𝑘,𝑗𝑗 is the within-state average of 
this variable, and 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 represents year fixed effects.24 
 Equation (10) distinguishes a time-invariant component of 𝑋𝑋 (i.e., average of X, denoted 
as 𝑋𝑋�) and a time-varying component of 𝑋𝑋 (i.e., 𝑋𝑋 − 𝑋𝑋�). The coefficient of interest is 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘. That is, if 
𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  is statistically significant, we should control for the variable in our regression because of 
potential endogeneity. In contrast, 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 and 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘 are less important for us because the market-wide 
trend and time-invariant component of state-level variables are already controlled for by the fixed-
effects structure in equation (3). We select variables that may have a strong impact on law 
enactment, including (1) log of number of public firms incorporated in the state, (2) log of number 
of public firms headquartered in the state, (3) business combination law dummy, and more generic 
variables, including (4) log of total GDP and (5) log of per capita GDP.25 To estimate the model, 
we construct a sample starting from 1985, the year when the Smith v. Van Gorkom suit took place. 
In untabulated tests, we find that all the coefficients are statistically insignificant except for the 
average log of number of public firms incorporated in the state (p-value = 0.078). This finding 
suggests that states with more incorporated firms are more likely to enact the director liability laws 
                                                 
24 We do not include state fixed effects in the hazard rate function because they will “perfectly explain” the timing of 
law enactments (i.e., each state fixed effect explains the timing of law enactment for each state) and cause all the other 
coefficients to remain unidentified. 
25  We obtain state-level GDP and population data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis website 
https://www.bea.gov/regional/ (downloaded on 11/09/2017). 
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early, presumably because the D&O insurance crisis affected more firms in those states and, hence, 
enacting director-liability-reduction laws became more urgent. Because the fixed-effects structure 
already controls for the average log of number of public firms incorporated in the state, it will not 
bias our main findings. Finally, we also explicitly control for these five variables as well as their 
interactions with 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 , 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺 , and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺  in our regression. We find that our results are 
robust. 
7.2 PARALLEL TRENDS 
To verify that the parallel trends assumption holds, we examine when the change in 
conditional conservatism occurred (cf. Autor [2003]; Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian [2014]). 
Specifically, we set the conditional conservatism five or more years before the enactment of the 
laws as a benchmark and examine whether conditional conservatism decreased before the 
enactment of the laws as follows: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × �𝛽𝛽4 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ �𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝜏𝜏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × �𝛽𝛽8,𝜏𝜏 + 𝛽𝛽9,𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽10,𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽11,𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�4
𝜏𝜏=1
+ 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (11) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝜏𝜏 is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation is from 𝜏𝜏 (𝜏𝜏 = 1, 2, 3, 4) year(s) 
before law enactments and equals zero otherwise. 
If the parallel trends assumption holds, the coefficient 𝛽𝛽11,𝜏𝜏  should not be statistically 
significant (i.e., there is no difference in conditional conservatism between firms  in different states 
before the laws were enacted). Table 9 reports the results of regression (11). The coefficient 𝛽𝛽11,𝜏𝜏 
is statistically insignificant for every 𝜏𝜏, which supports the parallel trends assumption.  
7.3 OTHER ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In Internet Appendix A, we discuss additional tests that show our results are robust to (1) 
the placebo test suggested by Patatoukas and Thomas [2016], (2) including additional firm 
characteristics as controls, (3) alternative sample-selection criteria, (4) self-selection for state of 
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incorporation, and (5) including state-specific linear time trends in the fixed-effects structure of 
equation (3).  
8. Conclusion 
Non-officer directors are usually outsiders who are elected to monitor and help resolve the 
agency conflict between managers and shareholders in various domains including financial 
reporting. However, verifying this assertion empirically is challenging, because director selection 
and director behavior are usually endogenous choices. To draw stronger causal inferences, we 
study the staggered enactment of director-liability-reduction laws by states that reduced non-
officer-directors’ litigation risk. We find that conditional conservatism decreased after the law 
enactments, which is consistent with director-liability-reduction laws reducing non-officer-
directors’ legal liability, and hence, reducing their monitoring of financial reporting practices. We 
also find that the decrease in conditional conservatism is smaller when firms have high shareholder 
power or high debt-contracting demand, which suggests that the demand for conservatism from 
major stakeholders moderates the relation between the law enactments and conditional 
conservatism. 
Our results are robust to several sensitivity checks such as using alternative conditional 
conservatism models and controlling for confounding factors that could impact our asymmetric 
timeliness measure. Our results provide insight into the monitoring by non-officer directors of 
financial reporting and have implications for evaluating corporate governance reforms and 
corporate law reforms that involve non-officer directors such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
Prior research focuses on audit committee members as monitors of the financial reporting process 
(e.g., Abbott, Parker, and Peters [2004]; Krishnan and Visvanathan [2008]); our results suggest 
that researchers might benefit from expanding their analysis to all outside directors.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
ACC Accruals scaled by total assets, defined as the change in non-cash current 
assets (Compustat data item ACT - Compustat data item CHE) minus the 
change in non-debt current operating liability (Compustat data item LCT - 
Compustat data item DLC - Compustat data item TXDITC) minus 
depreciation (Compustat data item DP) scaled by beginning-of-year total 
assets (Compustat data item AT) 
 
ACCR Accruals, defined as the change in non-cash current assets (Compustat data 
item ACT - Compustat data item CHE) minus the change in non-debt current 
operating liability (Compustat data item LCT - Compustat data item DLC - 
Compustat data item TXDITC) minus depreciation (Compustat data item DP) 
scaled by beginning-of-year market value of equity defined as common share 
price (Compustat data item PRCC_F) times common shares outstanding 
(Compustat data item CSHO) 
 
ATURNOVER Asset turnover ratio, defined as sales revenue (Compustat data item REVT) 
scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (Compustat data item AT) 
 
BIGN An indicator for choosing a Big N auditor. The variable takes the value of 1 if 
auditor (Compustat data item AU) is 1 to 8 
 
BTM Book-to-market ratio, defined as beginning-of-year book value of equity 
(Compustat data item CEQ) divided by beginning-of-year market value of 
equity defined as common share price (Compustat data item PRCC_F) times 
common shares outstanding (Compustat data item CSHO) 
 
CF Operating cash flows scaled by total assets, defined as the difference between 
income before extraordinary items (Compustat data item IB) scaled by 
beginning-of-year total assets (Compustat data item AT) and accruals (ACC) 
 
CFO Operating cash flows, defined as the difference between earnings (EARN) and 
accruals (ACCR) 
 
CURRENT Current ratio, defined as current assets (Compustat data item ACT) scaled by 
current liability (Compustat data item LCT) 
 
DCF An indicator for bad cash flow news. This variable takes the value of 1 when 
operation cash flow (CF) is negative 
 
DCD Proxy for debt-contracting demand, defined as (1) an indicator that equals 1 if 
a firm is a net debt issuer (i.e., a firm experienced an increase in total debt, 
defined as short term debt plus long term debt (Compustat data item DLC + 
Compustat data item DLTT) scaled by total assets (Compustat data item AT) 
between the pre- and post-law-enactment period), following Jayaraman and 
Shivakumar (2013), and (2) the change in firm total debt from before to after 
law enactment scaled by total assets 
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DE An indicator for bad employment news. This variable takes the value of 1 
when employee growth (EGR) is negative 
 
DP Depreciation component of accruals, defined as depreciation and amortization 
(Compustat data item DP) scaled by beginning-of-year market value of equity 
defined as common share price (Compustat data item PRCC_F) times 
common shares outstanding (Compustat data item CSHO) 
 
DS An indicator for bad sales news. This variable takes the value of 1 when sales 
growth (SGR) is negative 
 
EARN Earnings, defined as income before extraordinary items (Compustat data item 
IB) scaled by beginning-of-year market value of equity defined as common 
share price (Compustat data item PRCC_F) times common shares outstanding 
(Compustat data item CSHO) 
 
EGR Employee growth rate, defined as the percentage change in total number of 
employees (Compustat data item EMP) from the previous year 
LEV Leverage, defined as beginning-of-year short term debt plus beginning-of-
year long term debt (Compustat data item DLC + Compustat data item DLTT) 
scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (Compustat data item AT) 
 
LN(ASSETS) Log total assets, defined as the natural logarithm of beginning-of-year total 
assets (Compustat data item AT) 
NEG An indicator for bad cash flow news. This variable takes the value of 1 when 
market-adjusted stock return (RET) is negative and is 0 otherwise 
 
POST An indicator for firm-years after a director-liability law enactment. This 
variable takes the value of 1 when firm-year observations occur after the year 
in which a director-liability-reduction law is enacted in a firm’s state of 
incorporation, and is 0 otherwise 
 
RET Market-adjusted stock return, defined as buy-and-hold stock return (CRSP 
data item RET) over the fiscal year (starting from three months after the fiscal 
year starts) adjusted by the value-weighted stock return (CRSP data item 
VWRETD) over the same period 
 
ROA Return on assets, defined as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat 
data item IB) scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (Compustat data item 
AT) 
 
SGR Sales growth rate, defined as the percentage change in total sales revenue 
(Compustat data item REVT) from the previous year 
 
SHPOWER Proxy for shareholder power, defined as (1) the percentage of outstanding 
shares owned by institutional investors (Thomson Reuters data item 
INSTOWN_PERC), (2) the percentage of outstanding shares owned by 
dedicated institutional investors following Bushee (2001), and (3) G-index 
(indicates low shareholder power) 
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SIZE Firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of market value of equity at the 
beginning of the year defined as beginning-of-year common share price 
(Compustat data item PRCC_F) times beginning-of-year common shares 
outstanding (Compustat data item CSHO) 
 
ΔCA Current assets component of accruals, defined as change in non-cash current 
assets (Compustat data item ACT - Compustat data item CHE) scaled by 
market value of equity at beginning-of-year defined as beginning-of-year 
common share price (Compustat data item PRCC_F) times beginning-of-year 
common shares outstanding (Compustat data item CSHO) 
 
ΔCL Current liability component of accruals, defined as change in non-debt current 
liabilities (Compustat data item LCT - Compustat data item DLC - Compustat 
data item TXDITC) scaled by market value of equity at beginning-of-year 
defined as beginning-of-year common share price (Compustat data item 
PRCC_F) times beginning-of-year common shares outstanding (Compustat 
data item CSHO) 
 
ΔINV Change in inventories, defined as change in inventories (Compustat data item 
INVT) scaled by market value of equity at beginning-of-year defined as 
beginning-of-year common share price (Compustat data item PRCC_F) times 
beginning-of-year common shares outstanding (Compustat data item CSHO) 
 
ΔREC Change in receivables, defined as change in receivables (Compustat data item 
RECT) scaled by market value of equity at beginning-of-year defined as 
beginning-of-year common share price (Compustat data item PRCC_F) times 
beginning-of-year common shares outstanding (Compustat data item CSHO) 
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Table 1. Director-Liability-Reduction Laws’ Enactment Years 
State Enactment Year Before After Total 
Alabama 1994 60 22 82 
Arizona 1987 35 42 77 
Arkansas 1987 32 36 68 
California 1987 624 619 1243 
Colorado 1987 79 103 182 
Connecticut 1989 184 179 363 
Delaware 1986 4897 9162 14059 
Florida 1987 282 409 691 
Georgia 1987 160 313 473 
Hawaii 1989 24 26 50 
Idaho 1987 32 34 66 
Illinois 1993 241 88 329 
Indiana 1986 207 366 573 
Iowa 1987 103 104 207 
Kansas 1987 43 58 101 
Kentucky 1988 57 72 129 
Louisiana 1987 53 68 121 
Maine 1988 88 77 165 
Maryland 1988 244 300 544 
Massachusetts 1986 400 673 1073 
Michigan 1987 234 320 554 
Minnesota 1987 340 544 884 
Mississippi 1991 3 11 14 
Missouri 2000 267 38 305 
Nebraska 1988 13 38 51 
Nevada 1987 220 333 553 
New Hampshire 1991 12 19 31 
New Jersey 1987 367 468 835 
New Mexico 1987 16 19 35 
New York 1987 1070 1286 2356 
North Carolina 1987 94 180 274 
Ohio 1986 549 805 1354 
Oklahoma 1987 57 79 136 
Oregon 1987 99 162 261 
Pennsylvania 1987 543 756 1299 
Rhode Island 1987 43 69 112 
South Carolina 1988 60 107 167 
South Dakota 1987 20 30 50 
Tennessee 1987 38 69 107 
Texas 1987 330 463 793 
Utah 1987 44 80 124 
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Vermont 1993 51 25 76 
Virginia 1987 205 297 502 
Washington 1987 106 200 306 
Wisconsin 1987 259 334 593 
Wyoming 1987 21 29 50 
Total  12906 19512 32418 
     
States Excluded Because of Missing Before or After Law Enactment Data 
Alaska 1988 - - - 
Montana 1987 - - - 
North Dakota 1993 - - - 
West Virginia 2002 - - - 
 
This table reports the first director liability reduction law enactment years and the number of firm-year 
observations before enactment, after enactment, and in total for each state. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Firm-year Observations Before Director-Liability-Reduction Law Enactment (N=12,906)  
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. P1 P25 P75 P99 
EARN 0.102 0.104 0.116 -0.373 0.058 0.163 0.339 
RET 0.075 0.004 0.479 -0.770 -0.209 0.252 2.032 
NEG 0.494 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
SIZE 4.537 4.357 1.829 1.441 3.154 5.822 8.955 
BTM 0.867 0.768 0.531 0.096 0.466 1.149 2.600 
 
Panel B. Firm-year Observations After Director-Liability-Reduction Law Enactment (N=19,512) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. P1 P25 P75 P99 
EARN 0.048 0.063 0.106 -0.457 0.029 0.091 0.283 
RET 0.025 -0.035 0.466 -0.779 -0.253 0.205 1.814 
NEG 0.546 1.000 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
SIZE 5.615 5.472 2.082 1.644 4.012 7.104 10.587 
BTM 0.666 0.576 0.434 0.074 0.369 0.837 2.374 
 
Panel C. Variable Difference Before and After Director-Liability-Reduction Law Enactment 
Variable ΔMean t-statistic ΔMedian 𝜒𝜒2-statistic 
EARN -0.054 -43.13 -0.041 2.4 × 103 
RET -0.050 -9.38 -0.039 68.98 
NEG 0.052 9.18 1.000 N/A 
SIZE 1.078 47.83 1.115 1.2 × 103 
BTM -0.201 -37.28 -0.192 1.0 × 103 
 
This table reports the sample descriptive statistics. Panel A (Panel B) summarizes the descriptive statistics 
for the subsample before (after) director liability law enactment. Panel C tests the difference in the mean 
and median of the variables for the periods before and after director liability law enactment, and whether 
the differences are statistically significant. Mood’s non-parametric equality-of-medians test is used for the 
difference in medians (STATA command ‘median’). The median difference for NEG cannot be tested 
because NEG is an indicator. All variables are defined in the Appendix and winsorized at the extreme 
percentiles. 
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Table 3. Change in Conditional Conservatism after Director-Liability-Reduction Law 
Enactments 
Dependent Variable: EARN Prediction I II 
POST  -0.013 -0.012 
  (-1.36) (-1.43) 
POST × NEG  -0.003 0.007 
  (-0.21) (0.38) 
POST × RET  0.064 0.088*** 
  (1.64) (2.79) 
POST × NEG × RET − -0.221** -0.223** 
  (-2.52) (-2.02) 
Year Fixed Effects (Main)  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects (Main)  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects (Basu Coefficients)  Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects (Basu Coefficients)  Yes Yes 
Observations  32,418 14,143 
R2  0.561 0.634 
 
This table presents regression results of earnings on stock return, negative stock return dummy, post director 
liability law dummy, and their interaction terms. The three terms of the Basu model (i.e., NEG, RET, NEG 
× RET) are subsumed by the fixed effects structure, thus their coefficients are not reported. Column II is 
estimated using firms that are headquartered and incorporated in the same state. All variables are defined 
in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the extreme percentiles. *, **, and *** indicate 
p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively, for a two-tailed test; t-statistics are reported in parentheses and 
are based on standard errors clustered at the state level. 
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Table 4. Shareholder Power and the Change in Conditional Conservatism after Director-
Liability-Reduction Law Enactments 
Dependent Variable: EARN Prediction 
I II III 
SHPOWER 
= % inst. 
investors owned 
shares 
SHPOWER 
= % dedicated 
inst. investors 
owned shares 
SHPOWER  
= G-Index 
POST  -0.014** (-2.03) 
-0.014 
(-1.09) 
-0.005 
(-0.30) 
POST × NEG  -0.018 (-1.26) 
-0.010 
(-0.78) 
0.063 
(0.88) 
POST × RET  0.043** (2.35) 
0.068 
(1.29) 
0.061** 
(2.27) 
POST × NEG × RET − -0.296*** (-3.87) 
-0.244** 
(-2.12) 
-0.021 
(-0.84) 
SHPOWER  0.020** (2.44) 
-0.100*** 
(-3.14) 
-0.002 
(-1.13) 
SHPOWER × NEG  0.027** (2.54) 
-0.010 
(-0.20) 
0.007*** 
(3.46) 
SHPOWER × RET  0.014 (1.00) 
0.171*** 
(3.22) 
0.007 
(1.41) 
SHPOWER × NEG × RET  -0.170*** (-3.66) 
-0.303** 
(-2.22) 
0.023* 
(1.87) 
SHPOWER × POST  0.040*** (4.46) 
0.100*** 
(3.63) 
0.001 
(0.61) 
SHPOWER × POST × NEG  -0.014 (-0.78) 
0.026 
(0.60) 
-0.006*** 
(-3.18) 
SHPOWER × POST × RET  -0.059*** (-4.90) 
-0.244*** 
(-3.64) 
-0.006 
(-1.54) 
SHPOWER × POST × NEG × RET I &II:+ III: − 0.164*** (2.84) 0.489*** (2.85) -0.023** (-2.02) 
Year Fixed Effects (Main)  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects (Main)  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects (Basu Coefficients)  Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects (Basu Coefficients)  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  21,531 21,531 11,774 
R2  0.551 0.526 0.575 
 
This table presents regression results of earnings on stock return, negative stock return dummy, post-
director-liability-law indicator, shareholder power and their interaction terms. The three terms of the Basu 
model (i.e., NEG, RET, NEG × RET) are subsumed by the fixed effects structure, thus their coefficients are 
not reported. All variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
extreme percentiles. *, **, and *** indicate p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively, for a two-tailed test; 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at the state level. 
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Table 5. Debt-Contracting Demand and the Change in Conditional Conservatism after 
Director-Liability-Reduction Law Enactments 
Dependent Variable: EARN Prediction 
I II 
DCD 
=1(change in net 
debt > 0) 
DCD 
= change in net 
debt 
POST  -0.016 (-1.61) 
-0.013 
(-1.43) 
POST × NEG  -0.001 (-0.05) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
POST × RET  0.069* (1.84) 
0.068* 
(1.81) 
POST × NEG × RET − -0.256*** (-3.05) 
-0.211** 
(-2.50) 
DCD × NEG  -0.002 (-0.46) 
-0.013 
(-0.57) 
DCD × RET  0.008* (1.82) 
0.038 
(1.28) 
DCD × NEG× RET  -0.090*** (-5.36) 
-0.363*** 
(-6.52) 
DCD × POST  0.008** (2.01) 
-0.018 
(-0.88) 
DCD × POST × NEG  0.003 (0.59) 
0.021 
(0.96) 
DCD × POST × RET  -0.018*** (-2.89) 
-0.067** 
(-2.12) 
DCD × POST × NEG × RET + 0.121*** (7.59) 0.449*** (6.50) 
Year Fixed Effects (Main)  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects (Main)  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects (Basu Coefficients)  Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects (Basu Coefficients)  Yes Yes 
Observations  32,418 32,418 
R2  0.563 0.564 
 
This table presents regression results of earnings on stock return, negative stock return dummy, post-
director-liability-law indicator, debt-contracting demand and their interaction terms. The three terms of the 
Basu model (i.e., NEG, RET, NEG × RET) are subsumed by the fixed effects structure, thus their 
coefficients are not reported. All variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the extreme percentiles. *, **, and *** indicate p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively, for 
a two-tailed test; t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at the 
state level.  
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Table 6. Change in Accruals and Cash Flows Asymmetry After Director-Liability-Reduction Law Enactments 
Panel A: Director-Liability-Reduction Laws and Asymmetric Timeliness of Accruals, Accrual Components, and Cash Flows 
Dependent Variable: Prediction I II III IV V VI ACCR CFO Δ𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸 −Δ𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 Δ𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷 Δ𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼 
POST  -0.056*** (-6.74) 
0.051*** 
(6.15) 
-0.030** 
(-2.61) 
-0.009 
(-0.77) 
-0.017* 
(-1.97) 
-0.019** 
(-2.26) 
POST × NEG  0.027** (2.16) 
-0.027 
(-1.23) 
0.010 
(0.73) 
0.011 
(0.67) 
0.014 
(1.57) 
-0.004 
(-0.38) 
POST × RET  0.175*** (3.31) 
-0.152** 
(-2.32) 
0.180** 
(2.68) 
-0.009 
(-0.26) 
0.079** 
(2.47) 
0.123** 
(2.62) 
POST × NEG × RET I, III, V, & VI: − 
II & IV: 0 
-0.235*** 
(-2.78) 
0.011 
(1.02) 
-0.251** 
(-2.66) 
0.035 
(0.73) 
-0.095* 
(-1.74) 
-0.211*** 
(-4.04) 
Year Fixed Effects (Main)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects (Main)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects (Basu 
Coefficients)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects (Basu 
Coefficients)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  31,219 31,219 31,219 31,219 31,120 31,120 
R2  0.354 0.572 0.251 0.277 0.211 0.182 
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Panel B: Director-Liability-Reduction Law and Asymmetric Timeliness of Accruals to Disaggregated Bad News Indicators 
Dependent Variable: ACC Prediction I 
POST  0.001 (0.17) 
POST × SGR × DS − -0.055 (-0.31) 
POST × EGR × DE − -0.139*** (-2.91) 
POST × CFt-1 × DCt-1 + 0.377*** (4.22) 
POST × CFt × DCt − -0.530** (-2.19) 
POST × CFt+1 × DCt+1 − -0.122 (-1.05) 
Interactions between POST and Byzalov-Basu Terms  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects (Main)  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects (Main)  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects (Byzalov-Basu Coefficients)  Yes 
State Fixed Effects (Byzalov-Basu Coefficients)  Yes 
Observations  26,325 
R2  0.805 
 
This table presents regression results of the change in accruals asymmetric timeliness around director-liability-law enactments. Panel A regresses 
accrual, accrual components, and operating cash flows on stock return, negative stock return dummy, post-director-liability-law indicator, and their 
interaction terms. Panel B regresses accruals on sales growth, employee growth, cash flows, bad news indicators, post-director-liability-law indicator, 
and their interaction terms. The three terms of the Basu model (i.e., NEG, RET, NEG × RET) in Panel A and the fifteen terms of the Byzalov and 
Basu model in Panel B are subsumed by the fixed effects structure; thus their coefficients are not reported. All variables are defined in the Appendix.  
All continuous variables are winsorized at the extreme percentiles. *, **, *** indicate p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively, for a two-tailed test; 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at the state level. 
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Table 7. Auditor Choice after Director-Liability-Reduction Law Enactments 
Dependent Variable: BIGN Prediction I 
POST − -0.352** 
  (-2.10) 
LN(ASSETS)  0.372*** 
  (6.90) 
ATURNOVER  0.233** 
  (1.97) 
CURRENT  -0.016 
  (-0.63) 
LEV  -0.147*** 
  (-4.73) 
ROA  -0.675 
  (-1.40) 
Year Fixed Effects (Main)  Yes 
State Fixed Effects (Main)  Yes 
Observations  32,418 
R2  0.128 
 
This table presents logit regression results of Big N dummy variable on post director liability law dummy, 
log total assets, asset turnover ratio, current ratio, leverage, and return on assets. Variables are defined in 
the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the extreme percentiles. *, **, *** indicate p<0.10, 
p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively, for a two-tailed test; t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based 
on standard errors clustered at the state level. 
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Table 8. Controlling for Antitakeover Law Enactments 
Dependent Variable: EARN Prediction I II III 
POST  -0.011 -0.016** -0.009 
  (-1.11) (-2.15) (-0.73) 
POST × NEG  0.010** -0.001 -0.009 
  (2.45) (-0.09) (-0.39) 
POST × RET  0.063*** 0.082** 0.061 
  (7.09) (2.07) (1.22) 
POST × NEG × RET − -0.154** -0.250*** -0.235** 
  (-2.55) (-3.09) (-2.51) 
BC  0.010** 0.005 0.008 
  (2.60) (0.97) (1.47) 
BC × NEG  0.003 -0.001 0.005 
  (0.87) (-0.21) (0.52) 
BC × RET  -0.012 -0.003 -0.016* 
  (-1.30) (-0.27) (-1.71) 
BC × NEG × RET + 0.081*** 0.024 0.067* 
  (4.34) (1.03) (1.79) 
Year Fixed Effects (Main)  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects (Main)  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects (Basu Coefficients)  Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects (Basu Coefficients)  No Yes Yes 
Other Types of Antitakeover Laws  No No Yes 
Observations  23,227 23,227 16,504 
R2  0.597 0.610 0.514 
 
This table presents regression results of earnings on stock return, negative stock return dummy, post director liability law dummy, business 
combination law dummy, and their interaction terms. Column III is generated using observations after (including) 1983 only, and the regression also 
controls for the impact of other types of antitakeover laws. The three terms of the Basu model (i.e., NEG, RET, NEG × RET) are subsumed by the 
fixed effects structure, thus their coefficients are not reported. Variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
extreme percentiles. *, **, and *** indicate p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively, for a two-tailed test; t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
and are based on standard errors clustered at the state level. 
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Table 9. Test for Parallel Trends Assumption 
Dependent Variable: EARN Prediction I 
PRE1 × NEG × RET 0 -0.027 
  (-0.57) 
PRE2 × NEG × RET 0 -0.045 
  (-0.98) 
PRE3 × NEG × RET 0 0.033 
  (0.72) 
PRE4 × NEG × RET 0 0.006 
  (0.14) 
POST × NEG × RET − -0.234** 
  (-2.54) 
POST, POST × NEG, and POST × RET  Yes 
PREτ, PREτ × NEG, and PREτ × RET  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects (Main)  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects (Main)  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects (Basu Coefficients)  Yes 
State Fixed Effects (Basu Coefficients)  Yes 
Observations  32,418 
R2  0.562 
 
This table presents regression results of earnings on stock return, negative stock return dummy, post director 
liability law dummy, dummies for one to four years before law enactment, and their interaction terms. The 
three terms of the Basu model (i.e., NEG, RET, NEG × RET) are subsumed by the fixed effects structure, 
thus their coefficients are not reported. Variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the extreme percentiles. *, **, *** indicate p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively, for a 
two-tailed test; t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered at the state 
level. 
 
 
